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Abstract. As one of the first articles to empirically explore the direct costs of
cyber incidents, our research provides novel and significant insights into the
structural links between cyber incidents, exposure, and security within firms, as
well as the related technical consequences. We employ an explorative approach,
which is based on the causal information/cyber risk models proposed by Cohen
et al. and Woods & Böhme, as well as PLS-modeling to analyze data from 493
firms that have incurred direct costs from their most severe cyber incident in the
last 12 months. These data are part of a larger dataset, based on a representative
and stratified random sample of 5,000 organizations that participated in a survey
in 2018/19. Based on our model, we discuss the results and derive implications
that are highly relevant to the alignment of IT (security) strategy and
management. Furthermore, we identify gaps to be assessed in future research.
Keywords: IT-security investment, cybercrime losses, impact of data breaches
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Introduction

Reports of severe repercussions resulting from cyber attacks against firms, such as the
shutdown of the US colonial pipeline in May 2021 [1] or a ransomware attack forcing
800 Swedish Coop grocery stores to close in July 2021 [2], are regularly discussed
within the media. However, research has thus far produced little or conflicting evidence
on how firm-based interventions, such as IT-security investments, can reduce cyber
risks [3]. In fact, a recent literature review came to the conclusion that even after ten
years of cyber analyses, we have learned little about cyber incidents and their financial
costs, which could lead to ‘perceptions that cyber risk is more art than science’ [3].
Although there is a growing body of information security (IS) research, such research
has mostly been limited to either conceptual papers, analytical modeling, or purely
economic perspectives, while empirical analyses in this domain have predominantly
focused on individuals, staff, and compliance behavior [4]. Empirical IS research
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focusing on security interventions and harm on an organizational level, however, is rare
[3, 5, 6]. Regarding the negative consequences of cyber incidents, such as financial
costs and the causal relationships behind them, the literature cites a particularly great
need for research [3, 7–9]. Very few researchers have directly linked security attempts
to harm outcomes, included potential confounding variables in their research designs,
or controlled for firm characteristics [3]. Of the studies that have done this [7, 10–17],
none have focused on the financial costs of cyber incidents for individual organizations.
Studies that, on the other hand, have focused on the costs of cyber incidents within
firms have produced evidence on the distribution, magnitude, and frequency of costs,
but have neglected explanations for the mechanisms behind them [18–28]. Policymakers, insurance companies, and firms ultimately have a great interest in models that
can explain the cost of cyber incidents [17]. The importance of determining the costs
of cyber incidents is based on the assumption that corporate information security
management (ISM) is subject to the principle of economic efficiency, which demands
a balance between the costs and benefits of IS [29–33]. Without knowing which drivers
determine the costs of cyber incidents, it is difficult for organizations to operate an
efficient ISM. Against this background, we pose our research question (RQ):
How can the direct costs of a cyber incident be explained with regard to existing
firm characteristics and implemented security measures?
Challenges relating to research on cyber risk and harm repeatedly refer to a) the
difficulty of accessing reliable data [9, 34–37], and b) the lack of a consistent theoretical
foundation for the phenomenon [8, 35, 38].
In the context of a government-funded research project to improve IS within German
firms, we conducted a large-scale interview study with 5,000 firms across all industries
in 2018/2019. Due to our ability to access this data, which included questions on firm
characteristics, victimization experiences, and negative outcomes of incidents, we are
able overcome difficulty a). Our choice to employ an explorative approach, which is
based on the cyber risk cause and effect models proposed by Cohen's et al. (1998) [39]
and Woods & Böhme (2021) [3], is based on our use of secondary data, as well as the
lack of guidance provided by distinct cyber theories. The aim of our paper is to use an
explorative approach to uncover initial relationships between firm characteristics,
security measures, and the costs of cyber incidents, which can then, by future research,
be examined in more detail using suitable theories and specially collected data.
A suitable statistical technique for exploratory research relating to artifacts in design
science is partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) [40–43]. PLS-PM is a method
used to analyze “high-dimensional data in a low-structure environment” [40], which is
already established in IS research and has developed into a "full-fledged" analysis
method in recent years [40, 44, 45]. Furthermore, PLS-PM is an appropriate tool in
cases where the structural model is complex and includes many constructs, the research
includes financial ratios or similar types of data artifacts, and/or the research is based
on secondary data that lacks comprehensive measurement theory [42].
To answer our research question, our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the terminological and conceptual foundations used within our article. Our research
model, including the data used and the operationalization of our measurement and

structural model, is presented in section 3. Section 4 reports our results and addresses
the quality criteria and the model fit. A discussion of what the exploratory findings
imply, and the requirements of future research can be found in section 5. Finally, we
outline limitations in section 6 and conclude our article in section 7.

2

Conceptual foundations

In this section, we describe our terminological and conceptual foundations.
Information security (IS) Our basic assumption is that an internal or external threat
initiates a cyber attack, which is either stopped by a security measure/control (in this
case, remaining an IS/cyber event) or leads to an IS/cyber incident by exploiting a
vulnerability, which thus causes consequences for an organization. We define cyber
attacks, which lead to cyber incidents, as intentional attacks against firms that disrupt,
disable, destroy, or maliciously control a computing environment/ infrastructure;
destroy the integrity of the data, or steal controlled information [46]. The objectives of
information security, confidentiality, integrity and availability, for systems, data, and
processes are thus no longer guaranteed [47].
Search for related literature & theory To structure the analysis of our secondary
data, we used existing literature reviews (i.e., Eling (2020) [35], Eling & Schnell (2016)
[48], Anderson et al. (2019) [49], Dreissigacker et al. (2020) [50], and Woods & Böhme
2021 [3]) to scan for articles that empirically or theoretically explained ‘direct costs’,
‘losses’, or more generally ‘harm of cyber incidents’ and ‘data breaches’ in relation to
organizations. In addition to a backward and forward search, we conducted a Google
Scholar search using the above search terms to identify additional literature. Since the
articles that our search identified did not include cyber theories that suited our research
field, which confirms the theory gap that has already been identified by others [8, 35,
38], we screened all theories provided in the information systems research wiki [51].
However, we did not find any holistic approaches that explained cyber harm, costs, or
risk on an organizational level. Instead, the recently introduced causal model by Woods
& Böhme [3], which explains cyber risk outcomes, seems to be the best available
approach to conceptually support our research question.
IS cause-effect model Cohen et al.’s (1998) cause-and-effect model of attacks on
information systems asserts that “causes (also called threats) use mechanisms (also
called attacks) to produce effects (also called consequences)”, while “protective
mechanisms (also called defenses) are used to mitigate harm by acting to limit the
causes, mechanisms, or effects” [39]. Cohen et al. specify potential individual threats,
attacks, consequences, and defenses, but fail to articulate possible latent variables and
discuss these in relation to existing literature. More than 20 years later, Woods &
Böhme introduced a causal model that also follows this logic, but additionally includes
the concept of security exposure and discusses latent variables.1 Within their high-level
1

In their more detailed causal model, Woods & Böhme also differentiate between preventative
and reactive security, as well as surface and asset exposure, embracing the construct
compromise. Given that our secondary dataset is unable to differentiate between these
constructs, we do not explain the concept in more detail.

causal model of cyber risks, they assume that ‘threats’ to the IS of organizations,
expressed by different threat levels, is the only condition required for ‘harm’ to occur
[3]. As a third construct, ‘security’ moderates the relationship between threat and harm,
insofar that more security leads to less expected harm. The fourth construct ‘exposure’
indicates that more vectors can be used to intrude systems and more assets can be
compromised, leading to exposure amplifying the effect that threat has on harm [3]. To
analyze the harm resulting from cyber incidents, the authors describe several indicators
to operationalize these four latent constructs and describe additional relevant variables,
which should be included in regression models to minimize effects of confounding
factors. In the next section, we derive these, as well as other indicators and variables
from the literature to the extent that our secondary data permits.

3

Research approach and model

This section describes our research approach, including the data used, as well as the
description and derivation of our measurement and structural model.
Survey data We use data based on a representative and stratified random sample of
5,000 firms, which was conducted within the context of a government-funded initiative
to improve IS in German firms. The stratified sample included 1,190 firms with 10-49
employees, 1,181 firms with 50-99 employees, 1,120 firms with 100-249 employees,
1,005 firms with 250-499 employees, and 504 large firms with more than 500
employees. Our sample thereby indicates a focus on small and medium enterprises
(SME). The dataset accounts for the 18 official German WZ08 industry classifications,
which allows for international comparison.
From August 2018 to January 2019, computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI)
were carried out with mainly IT/IS managers (69.8%) and board members (23.5%)
working for firms with more than nine employees. Participants were asked about risk
perceptions, detected cyber-incidents within the last 12 months, existing organizational
and technical IS measures, as well as demographic characteristics of the firms. Further
descriptions of the sample, the survey procedure, data quality and pretesting measures,
as well as the questionnaire used can be found in the official research report [50, 52].
Employee
count
(N=493)
Most severe
attack type
(N=493)
Sector WZ08
class (N=493)

Agricu.
Finance

10-49

<100

25%
Ransom

<250

24%
Spy

Malware

32%

Man Hack

7%

25%

7%

0%
10%
20%
Mining
Manuf.
Real Est. Prof. S.

30%
Energy
Buss. S.

<500
20%

DDOS

21%
15%

40%
Water
Public

Deface
4%

5%

>500
20%

5%

50%
60%
Constru. Trade
Edu.
Health

CEO

9%

11%
Phishing

6%
9%

4% 4%

19%
10%

3%

70%
80%
90%
100%
Transp.
Accom.
Inform.
Entert.
Other

Figure 1. Characteristics of sub-sample

A detailed section of the questionnaire referred to the most severe incident experienced
by firms within the last 12 months. Firms that reported a most severe incident were

Threat

particularly asked about system downtimes and direct costs. This fact, combined with
the decision to not impute missing data, led to a strong reduction in the number of
observations due to the listwise-deletion approach employed within the PLS regression.
Of the 5,000 firms that were surveyed, 2,004 (40%) reported experiencing a most severe
cyber incident in the last 12 months. Of those, 996 firms reported actual costs in EUR.
The observations remaining in the main model, following the listwise deletion of
missing values, were reduced to 493 (Figure 1).
PLS-PM As stated in our introduction, PLS-PM is an appropriate tool to explore
complex empirical models. Such structural equation modeling can simultaneously
estimate and test causal relationships between multiple independent and dependent
variables [53]. PLS-PM models consist of two main components: i) the measurement
model (also referred to as the outer model), which defines the relationships between a
construct and its observed indicators (also referred to as manifest variables or single
indicators), and ii) the structural model (also referred to as the inner model), which
defines the relationships between the constructs [44]. Since our research design
accounts for both emergent and latent variables, PLS-PM is well suited and can
leverage its full capacities [40].
Constructs within the structural model Following Occam's Razor, the high-level
causal model described is lean and reduced to the bare minimum but has relatively little
explanatory power at this level. Therefore, it is important to operationalize the
constructs at a lower level of abstraction, whilst also ensuring that the model remains
streamlined. Since IS is a highly complex subject area, which does not only depend on
technology but also strongly on organizational aspects and human behavior [4, 54],
these aspects should be considered within the research design. Despite the challenge of
operationalizing IS, self-reported indicators have successfully shown to explain IS
outcomes [3, 10, 55]. However, in order to eliminate potential confounding variables,
it is important to include relevant independent variables within the research design [3,
40], which of course entails a certain number of variables and their relationships.
Firm
The corresponding items and
Security
Harm
Characteristics
constructs from the secondary
Basic
dataset were assigned in line
Resources (R)
Technical
Security (TS)
with the threat-exposureEmergent variable
Technical
security-harm causal chain,
Consequence
Exposure (E)
outlined in section 2. This
(TC)
Basic
mapping was based on two
Organizational
Security (OS)
Compliance
rounds of feedback from
(C)
Direct Costs
relevant
industry
and
Latent variable
(DC)
academia
experts, who
Single indicator
Attack
Advanced
accompanied our associated
Experience (A)
Security (AS)
research project [50], and the
amplifies
reduces
integration
of
available
literature. Figure 2 illustrates
Figure 2. Structural model
our structural model, whose

constructs we derive below. The corresponding indicators are summarized in the results
section (Table 1).
Threats Since the dataset cannot provide sufficient exogenous threat level items, we
rely on the threat level being implicit in the firm characteristics. Resources (R) The
availability of technological, financial, and human resources constitutes an important
aspect within the implementation of security solutions [4, 56]. Human resources are
required for the adoption and maintenance of technical and organizational IS measures,
while financial resources determine whether an organization can afford such IS
measures [57]. Besides the ‘IT-budget’, we therefore consider the amount of ‘IT staff’
as a relevant indicator for the emergent ‘resources’ variable. Moreover, we regard the
size of a firm, measured in ‘employee classes’, as a relevant determinant for their
‘resources’ (Table 1), since an organization’s size has previously been shown to affect
their IS and is commonly used as a control variable in similar research [7, 18, 34, 58].
Thus, we associate ‘resources’ with all security and harm constructs included within
the model. Exposure (E) Controlling for other variables, firms baring more complexity
(more locations in Germany and abroad, as well as export activity, see indicators E1E3, Table 1) and thus more surface exposure in terms of higher interconnectedness of
systems, processes, and infrastructure, are more vulnerable to cyber attacks [3].
Moreover, firms with more asset exposure (firms providing special products/services
or having a special reputation or customer base, E4-E5) are also more prone to the
attention of cyber attackers. Furthermore, we assume that rational acting firms with a
higher exposure also demonstrate greater protection motivation and thus favor
advanced security measures that go beyond basic technical and organizational IS
measures [17]. Compliance (C) Human behavior is the primary source of IS risk [35].
We consider ‘compliance’ to be the only latent variable in our model given that it
addresses behavior-oriented ratings of individuals, covering the indicators relating to
risk awareness and compliance behavior of staff/management, as well as the firms’
general IS efforts (Table 1). In this context, management awareness was found to be an
significant factor within the adoption of IS measures [59, 60]. Greater compliance and
managerial support both indicate that organizations more actively engage in raising IS
and are therefore more likely to implement security measures [61]. Attack Experience
(A) Prior IS research on organizational adoption factors of technology has investigated
the experience of firms with IT systems [62]. Details of previous experiences of cyber
attacks on IT systems could thus reveal a firm’s current process and system deficits,
and encourage managers to take additional IS measures to reduce the cyber risk [61],
which also relates to organizational learning [37]. In this context, previous IS incidents
could raise a firm’s perception of protection [63] and thus cause firms to favor advanced
IS measures. In the absence of scales to measure organizational IS [3], we use the selfreported existence of IS measures to operationalize the construct "security". Basic
Technical Security (TS) is an emergent variable that includes the IT security measures
used within our dataset, while Basic Organizational Security (OS) includes all
security measures, which are mostly concerned with people, processes, and procedures
[64]. We label them as basic since the majority of firms have already implemented such
measures [27]. In contrast, we combine indicators that, particularly with regard to
SMEs, have shown to go beyond fundamental IS measures [65] to Advanced Security

(AS). All security constructs in our model are related to harm. A Technical
Consequence (TC) refers to the amount of eight possible system types (email &
communication, order and customer management, accounting and controlling, web
presence, banking & trading, warehousing and logistics, production control, other) that
were affected by the most severe incident, as well as the total downtime of these system
types (in hours). To better manage the very skewed data relating to downtime and direct
costs, we used the natural logarithm of the downtime in hours and the estimated direct
costs in EUR [40, 66]. The final dependent variable in our model is Direct Costs (DC),
which consists of the sum (EUR) of six underlying cost items that are either direct or
opportunity costs (1. costs for external advice & support; 2. fines & compensation
payments; 3. drain of financial means; 4. costs for replacement & recovery; 5. defense
& investigation / personnel costs; 6. revenue loss / business interruption), estimated by
the respondents. The cost types were primarily derived from the established
Commercial Victimization Survey of the UK Home Office [67]. Since costs are
“unsecured” insofar that this variable includes data from firms that reported at least one
cost item, even when another item is reported to be ‘unknown’ or ‘not specified’, we
cannot prevent an underestimation of costs. The data does not include general operating
costs of IS, but incident costs only, and thus focuses on costs occurring as a
consequence and costs occurring in response to cybercrime [67]. Costs that are not
covered in our research include social, individual, and macroeconomic costs, as well as
anticipation and indirect costs (i.e., reputation loss) of incidents.

4

Results

This section reports on our results and model fit, and is mainly based on the recent PLS
guidelines proposed by Benitez et al. 2020 [40]. To calculate our model and to ensure
an adequate model fit, we used Adanco 2.2.1. and its broad reporting functionality.
Statistical power refers to the probability of correctly rejecting the false null
hypothesis and thus finding an effect in the sample that is indeed present in the
population [68]. According to Cohen’s regression power tables, our model requires at
least 102 observations, when assuming statistical power of .8, a medium effect size (f2
= .150), and significance level of 5% [40, 69]. Our sample containing 493 observations
thus seems more than appropriate. Estimation We used Mode B (regression weights)
to estimate emergent constructs and Mode A to estimate latent constructs. Moreover,
we set a dominant indicator to dictate the orientation of each construct (Table 1). For
statistical inferences, we used bootstrapping with 999 runs. We checked whether the
PLS-PM algorithm had properly converged (after 16 iterations) to prevent the
occurrence of Heywood cases [70] or a technically invalid estimation [40].
Assessment of measurement model To assess the validity of our construct
measurement, we report the overall model fit of the saturated model. All recommended
discrepancy measures (SRMR (Value: .0452; HI95: .0453); least squares discrepancy
dULS (Value: 1.078; HI95 1.085); geodesic discrepancy d G (Value: .259; HI95 .306))
were below the 95% quantile of their reference distribution (HI95), which thereby
provided empirical evidence for the emergent/latent variables included in our model.

Dijkstra-Henseler's rho (ρA: .881), which is used to assess the construct reliability for
reflective measurement models, and in our case solely the latent variable
“Compliance”, is above the recommended threshold of .707 [71]. With reference to the
latent variable, convergent validity can be assumed because the extracted measure of
the average variance (AVE: .612) is greater than .5 [40, 72]. In terms of indicator
reliability for latent variables, it is advisable to have significant (at 5% alpha level)
factor loadings that are greater than .707, although slightly lower values are seldom
problematic [40]. Except for indicator C2, in which the loading is very slightly below
.707, we meet these requirements (Table 1). VIF values [40] for our indicators range
from 1.000 to 1.673 and are thus far below the threshold of 5 [73, 74], which indicates
that multicollinearity does not pose an issue within our model.
Table 1. Indicators of measurement model
#

Indicator

R2
R3
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5

Employee class (10-49; <100; <250; <500;
>500)
IT-Sec budget last 12 month (in EUR)
Count IT-Sec staff
Export activity (1=yes)
Count of locations in Germany
Count of locations abroad
Special products / processes / services (1=yes)
Special reputation / customer base (1=yes)

A1

Count of experienced attacks last 12 months

R1

A2
C1
C2
C3
TS1
TS2
TS3
TS4
TS5
TS6
TS7
OS1
OS2
OS3
OS4
AS1
AS2
AS3
AS4
TC1
TC2
DC
IN

Count of experienced attack types last 12
months
Risk awareness & compliance of Mgt. (low;
rather low; rather high; high)
Risk awareness & compliance of staff (low;
rather low; rather high; high)
General IS effort
Password requirements (1=yes)
Individual user rights (1=yes)
Regular backups (1=yes)
Separate storage of backups (1=yes)
Antivirus software (1=yes)
Regular patching (1=yes)
Firewall (1=yes)
Written IS policy (1=yes)
Written emergency plan (1=yes)
Regular compliance checks (1=yes)
IS training (1=yes)
IT security certification (1=yes)
Regular risk assessments/pentests (1=yes)
IS failure simulations (1=yes)
Advanced firewall (1=yes)
Logarhytmized downtime of systems in hours
Count of failed system types

Span

Portion or
mean (SD)

Loading

Weight

1-5

2.8 (1.3)

.924***

.831***

0 - 6m
0 - 150
0-1
1 - 200
0 - 280
0-1
0-1
13,041

96k (343k)
2.3 (8.3)
39.8%
5.5 (16,8)
1.4 (14.0)
39.8%
53.8%
106.3
(348.9)

.591***
.265
.210°
.598***
.289
.691***
.671***

.393**
.001
.183
.622***
-.081
.481**
.419*

0-7

2.6 (1.4)

.956

.835

1-4

3.3 (0.7)

.748***

.307***

1-4

3.0 (0.7)

.678***

.293***

.636°

1-4
3.2 (0.7)
.904***
0-1
84.8%
.514***
0-1
92.3%
.716***
0-1
98.4%
.455***
0-1
93.5%
.397***
0-1
98.8%
.141
0-1
94.3%
.552***
0-1
98.6%
.122°
0-1
70.6%
.753***
0-1
60.9%
.845***
0-1
56.4%
.691**
0-1
49.9%
.686***
0-1
25.4%
.394***
0-1
51.7%
.707***
0-1
30.8%
.746***
0-1
71.0%
.629***
0 - 9.4
3.0 (1.93)
.989***
0-7
2.1 (1.2)
.582***
2.9 Logarhytmized direct costs of incident in EUR
7.8 (1.9)
14.5
Control variable: IT interviewee (1=yes)
0-1
67.1%
bold = dominant indicator; °p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, one -tailed

.317

.633***
.365**
.594***
.216
.232*
.033
.333*
.070
.292*
.493**
.130
.399*
.099
.428***
.534***
.414***
.914***
.165*
-

Not all loading and weight estimates relating to the latent variables are statistically
significant (Table 1), yet we decided to keep these indicators in our model to maintain
content validity [40] and prevent, in view of missing appropriate theoretical
measurement concepts relating to our emergent variables, a design-to-fit approach.
Firm Characteristics
Resources
(R)

Harm

Technical
Consequence
(TC)
R2 = .188
.445***

.109

Security
Basic
Technical
Security (TS)
R2 = .131

Exposure
(E)
Basic
Organizational
Security (OS)
R2 = .209

Direct Costs
(DC)
R2 = .230

.032

.083*

Compliance
(C)

Attack
Experience
(A)

.029

Advanced
Security (AS)
R2 = .287

.237***

Interviewee
(IN)
Control variable

Figure 3. Structural model (N=493); °p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, one-tailed

Assessment of the structural model Regarding the test of overall fit for the estimated
model, which for PLS-PM was only introduced recently [40], the SRMR of .061 was
above the HI95 but still below the recommended threshold of .080. The geodesic
discrepancy (dG::.322) was above the HI95 (.303) but below the HI99 (.365).
The path coefficients and corresponding significance levels are shown in Figure 3. The
coefficients can be interpreted as “the change in the dependent construct, measured by
standard deviations, if an independent construct is increased by one standard deviation
while keeping all other explanatory constructs constant (ceteris paribus consideration)”
[40]. For instance, whilst controlling for all other variables, increasing the basic
technical measures by one standard deviation will increase the technical outcome by
.116 standard deviations. Not all paths are significant and three paths, in contrast to the
underlying cause-and-effect-model, even show unexpected, though not significant,
signs (R→TC; OS→DC; AS→DC). Due to our exploratory research design, we, again,
decided to leave the non-significant paths in the model [40]. Possible implications of
the path coefficients will be discussed in the next section. 2 Cohen’s f2 effect sizes
between the constructs range from 0 to .209, in which only Technical consequences →
Direct costs (f2=.209) and Compliance → AdvRes (f2=.195) show medium effects,
2

To control for industry and attack type, we analyzed the same model, using the two
subsamples including solely manufacturing (N=122) and ransomware (N=162) incidents.
While the goodness of fit measures have not deteriorated for the subsamples, both seem to
explain more variance, compared to the main model.

whereas all others show either weak or no effects [69]. Benitez et al. explicitly note that
it is unusual and unlikely that most constructs will have large effect sizes [40].
As the final measure used for goodness of fit in regression analysis, we report on the
coefficient of determination (R2)(Figure 3), which lies between 0 and 1, and indicates
the proportion of the explained variance in a dependent variable and thus provides an
insight into a model’s predictive power [40, 75, 76]. The R2 values of our dependent
variables range from .131 to .287. Although this could be considered weak, according
to more recent PLS-PM guidelines, the expected magnitude of R2 depends on how well
a phenomenon has been investigated. Since, in our case, the phenomenon has not been
investigated particularly well [3], lower values are acceptable [40, 42].

5

Discussion

Based on our research question of how the direct costs of cyber incidents can be
explained with regard to existing firm characteristics and security measures, we discuss
our key findings and point out implications for academia and practice below.
Initially, the model coefficients show that greater size and resources of a firm are related
to more security measures, although the effect for basic technical measures is not
significant. This may be due to the fact that the indicators underlying the emergent
variable technical consequences show an overall low variance (see Table 1), meaning
that many firms have already adopted basis technical measures. Controlling for all other
variables in the model, greater size and resources indicate higher direct costs (coeff.
.164), a finding which has also been reported by previous research [26, 27].
This perceived contradiction between size, security, and cost may result from the costs
of an incident increasing disproportionately with the size of a firm and the
accompanying complexity of the IS ecosystem, even though larger firms take increased
measures. Moreover, it is possible that either the security constructs need to be
measured more accurately (i.e., more accurate maturity and dissemination) or that the
security constructs can generally only explain a proportion of the variance, meaning
that there may be other potential variables that influence the harm of incidents.
The first main finding of our research is that greater resources and greater exposure
are independently associated with higher costs of the most severe cyber incident
(coefficients .164 and .162, respectively) reported by firms. Surprisingly, no
corresponding effects are found with respect to technical consequences, suggesting that
firms with greater resources or greater exposure are not more affected by system
failures than firms that are less exposed or have fewer resources; merely the subsequent
costs of an incident are higher. This is explained, at least in part, by the fact that these
firms rely more heavily on advanced measures that are significantly negatively related
to technical consequences. For firms with greater resources or exposure, this means that
advanced measures are at least able to help reduce the risk of technical consequences
and associated costs. However, a greater risk of higher direct costs for these firms
remains. Future research should therefore examine the effectiveness and complex
interplay of security measures, as well as further differentiate the type of exposure and
direct costs, to allow for more detailed conclusions.

The second finding shows that greater compliance (i.e., greater risk awareness, more
compliant behavior by staff and management, and greater management role modeling)
is crucial in relation to the more technical (coeff. .171), organizational (coeff. .320),
and advanced security measures (coeff. .373). This points to the importance of binding
rules and commitment to IS in the digitally connected world. Interestingly, experience
of previous attacks has no independent effect on more advanced security measures. The
questions of what higher compliance depends on and whether incidents experienced in
the past also play a decisive role in raising IS remain open to future research.
The third finding relates to the influence of IS measures on the consequences of cyber
incidents. All three latent security variables have a negative effect on technical
consequences (technical measures -.116; advanced measures -.270), although the effect
of the organizational measures (coeff. -.074) is not significant. Independent effects on
the direct costs, on the other hand, are not observable. In practice, this means that
particularly the technical and advanced measures can mitigate technical consequences
for firms and, and thus, also direct costs. However, questions relating to which
individual technical and organizational measures have specific preventative or
mitigating effects on particular organizations' systems and processes, as well as the
associated costs, remain open to future research.
Direct costs, and this is the fourth key finding, are significantly influenced by technical
consequences (coeff. .445) within the model. As expected, the greater these are, the
higher the direct costs of a cyber incident. A total of 23% of the variance in direct costs
(R2=.230) could be explained by the model. This also means that there are other
variables, which are not included in the model, that influence direct costs. The
comparison of different subsamples provided initial indications as to other relevant
variables. The group comparison shows that there are sector-specific differences.
Despite less observations relating to the subsample manufacturing (N=122), advanced
security is unexpectedly affected by previously experienced attacks. In addition, the
explained variance for direct costs clearly increases from R2=.230 to R2=.346. If we
only consider ransomware attacks (subsample N=162), the model shows a stronger
influence of basic technical security on technical consequences. Future research should
distinguish between different types of attacks in this regard. It is conceivable, for
example, that certain types of social engineering attacks cause costs, but no technical
consequences, and simply could not have been prevented by certain IS measures, which
is suggested by the direct positive effect of exposure to direct costs discussed above.
The fifth and final finding relates to the control variable "interviewee," which has a
significant effect on all dependent variables within the explanatory model. For example,
IT employees rated both the direct costs of an incident and the technical, organizational,
and advanced security higher, but the technical consequences lower than non-IT
employees. It is unclear whether IT employees tend to report more positively on their
own area of responsibility (social desirability), whether they are worse at estimating
financial costs, or whether they are simply better informed than non-IT employees
because of their thematic proximity. In any case, this means that in future survey
studies, the personal characteristics of the interviewees should at least be controlled for.
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Limitations

Given that our study only refers to firms with 10 or more employees in Germany, the
results cannot be generalized to firms in other countries. The sample was drawn on the
basis of contact data from two commercial databases and not directly from the
population. Although we found no evidence of systematic bias, firms not included in
these databases were thereby also not included in our sample (coverage problem). As
with other survey studies, the possibility of self-report bias should be noted. In addition,
we retrospectively interviewed only one individual from each firm and the interviews
were also limited in terms of complexity due to time constraints. The data was collected
in 2018/2019. The events that have occurred in the meantime, such as the COVID-19
pandemic and the associated developments, have possibly led to a changed IS situation.
However, since we do not focus on the analysis of specific amounts of costs nor on
specific behavioral aspects of individuals, but instead on structural links of latent
variables on an organizational level, we assume that even in a pandemic, the
fundamental causal relationships of IS have not changed entirely. In addition, no other
representative data of comparable scope and detail is available. Given the lack of a
consistent theoretical basis for this research subject, we also note that our study is
exploratory in nature. The lack of consistent theoretical guidance [35], as well as hardly
any comparable empirical literature on this topic [3], can be cited as reasons why our
model shows primarily low to medium R2 and path coefficient measures [40, 42].
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Conclusion

In this paper, we empirically analyzed how the direct costs of cyber incidents can be
explained when considering firm characteristics and existing IS measures. We followed
an explorative approach based on the causal IS risk models proposed by Cohen et al.
[39] and Woods & Böhme [3], as well as partial least squares path modeling to analyze
our survey dataset of 5,000 German firms and to identify structural links between
attacks, exposure, security, and harm. Our analysis demonstrated that the direct costs
resulting from cyber incidents depend on both the resources and exposure of the firms,
as well as on the technical consequences related to the incident. The technical
consequences, in turn, depend on and can be reduced by the existing basic technical
and advanced security measures. We found that firms with greater compliance were
more likely to protect themselves with basic technical and advanced measures
compared to others and were thus able to minimize the technical consequences and
associated costs of incidents.
Although our research has provided novel and significant insights into the direct costs
of cyber incidents, we encourage validation of our findings based on other empirical
data. As our research has shown that IS is a highly complex field of research, with
numerous variables interacting at the technical, organizational, and human levels,
further research is needed to develop and test comprehensive cyber theories explaining
the costs of cyber incidents and to identify effective means of protection.
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